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Book Review: Free Country: Selected Lectures and Talks by
Sydney Kentridge QC
This collection of lectures and talks by Sydney Kentridge QC includes memorable and often
moving accounts of his experiences as an advocate practising in South Africa under a legal
system which not merely permitted racial discrimination but required it and in which, for
political cases, many of the protections essential to a fair trial had been abolished. Wider topics
addressed include the ethics of advocacy, freedom of speech, the rule of law and the selection
of judges. Ruth Houghton believes the collection will appeal to those interested in freedom of
speech and constitutional law.
Free Country: Selected Lectures and Talks. Sydney Kentridge QC.
Hart Publishing. November 2012.
Find this book: 
‘Free county, Chief ’, the punch line to the anecdote Sydney Kentridge QC
tells at the end of  his opening address at the 2007 Bar Conf erence in
London. When John Foster QC said those words to the Lord Chief
Justice he summed up, neatly, the independence of  the Bar and the legal
prof ession.
Sydney Kentridge QC, a highly respected advocate, has represented
three Nobel Peace Prize holders; Nelson Mandela, Archbishop Tutu and
Chief  Albert Luthuli. Spanning 30 years of  practice, Kentridge has
collected snapshots f rom his work as an advocate in Apartheid South
Af rica and the UK. Judging f rom some of  the lecture tit les this collection
could pose as a how-to-guide f or aspiring advocates; ‘Law and Lawyers
in a Changing Society’, ‘The Ethics of  Advocacy’, ‘A Barrister in the
Apartheid Years’. It is, however, more than that. Kentridge’s lectures debate the rule of  law and
f reedom of  speech with an overriding lesson on the independence of  the judiciary.
The lectures are permeated with a troubling anxiety, the role of  the advocate in the credibility of
an oppressive regime. Mr Joel Carlson, a South Af rican attorney thought his work was ‘assisting
the [Apartheid] regime to present an overall image, at home and overseas, of  judicial integrity and a f air
legal system’. Kentridge rejects this, emphasising his duty to his clients who required representation.
Developing the role of  the advocate, Chapter 5: ‘The Ethics of  Advocacy’ is an elaborate explanation of  the
cab-rank rule. A hollowed principle of  the Bar, Article 601 of  the UK Bar Code of  Conduct states a barrister
cannot ref use a case ‘on the ground that the nature of  the case is objectionable to him’. Kentridge
presents it as being both a shield and a weapon. During the Apartheid in South Af rica the cab-rank rule
became a lif e- line; def ence barristers, such as Kentridge, relied on the rule’s protection as it enabled them
to take on polit ical cases.
The South Af rica that Kentridge describes had the potential to undermine saf eguards in place f or
advocates. Kentridge, talking about government lawyers, said they ‘[…] would take on those cases without,
apparently, any qualm of  conscience’. Principle 18 of  The Basic Principles on the Role of  Lawyers states
that lawyers shall not be identif ied with their clients or their clients’ causes. Naturally, given the context,
these lawyers have been condemned, but in doing so the saf eguards in place to support def ence counsel
against oppressive regimes are weakened. These moral dilemmas are more troubling because they are not
artif icial. In a book that staunchly def ends independence, this example demonstrates that the codes of
conduct cannot always provide adequate answers.
Judicial independence is a recurring theme throughout the lectures. Sir Gerard Brennan said of  judicial
independence that it ‘is not proclaimed in order to benef it the Judges; it is proclaimed in order to guarantee
a f air and impartial hearing an unswerving obedience to the rule of  law’. However, Kentridge’s personal
anecdotes show that there is an overlap with the personal benef it to the judge and the protection of  the
rule of  law. In Chapter 7: ‘A Judge’s Duty in a Revolution’, Kentridge recounts the case of  Madzimbanuto. His
aim is to show how the interf erence with judicial independence led to the judiciary giving recognition to an
otherwise unlawf ul government. Alongside these constitutional implications he also highlights the personal
ef f ects, noting the resignation of  Judge Fieldsend. Reminding the reader that the judiciary is not only an
institution, but one made of  people, the independence of  the judiciary ‘depends f irst on the integrity of  the
judges’, which he challenges throughout the chapter. The highly personalised account dif f erentiates
Kentridge’s discussion on the rule of  law f rom other academic works.
Kentridge’s lectures, though repetit ive in their themes, are harrowingly applicable to today’s constitutional
ref orms and debates, such as the debate on the Bill of  Rights and the expansion of  the special advocate
procedure. Secret evidence and Terrorism laws are addressed in Chapter 10. The book is scattered with
words of  warning and Kentridge noted, some twenty years earlier that ‘one should not expect too much
f rom even an entrenched bill of  rights’. In light of  the ongoing debate about the dangers to civil liberties that
secret evidence poses, perhaps Kentridge is too blunt when he denies these challenges as ‘nonsense’. But
Kentridge approaches Brit ish constitutional debates moulded by his experiences in South Af rica, and invites
the reader to get a sense of  perspective.
Somewhat irksome are the out-dated theories and approaches to human rights in the book. As a journey
through the history of  South Af rica, it is not surprising that in parts these approaches are buried within
Kentridge’s speeches: “It is surely right that Western countries, if  their prof essions are sincere, should use
what inf luence and power they have to persuade other countries of  the value of  these rights and to induce
them to recognise and protect them”.
With due respect to Kentridge, as he alluded prior to this statement, it is now accepted that ‘inducement’ is
no longer an ef f ective means of  human rights protection as it connotes Western imperialism. Throughout
these historical lectures that are shaped by experiences in the late 1970s, the reader is of f ered a trajectory
to the present day on discussions on civil liberties.
Appealing to a reader interested in constitutional law, the relationship between the state and the individual
and civil liberties, this ref reshingly personal selection is highly thought provoking. Reeling f rom the depiction
of  an awf ul past, the reader is lef t to ponder the changes to evidence and rights that the Brit ish
Government now seek to implement. Kentridge QC leaves the reader asking what it truly means to be in a
‘Free Country’.
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